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When President Obama’s counter-terrorism advisor, John Brennan, announced recently that the Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) had surpassed Osama bin Laden’s Pakistan-based Al Qaeda as America’s greatest terrorist threat, it was confirmation of what intelligence analysts have already long suspected.
Brennan’s pronouncement of AQAP’s rise came shortly after the release of the Obama administration’s annual review on the Afghanistan-Pakistan situation. With its strongholds in northwest Pakistan under increased assault from the Pakistani Army, and its senior leadership rapidly depleted by US predator drones, Al Qaeda in Pakistan is in its most weakened condition since September 2001, the report said.
The report concluded that “Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership has been depleted, the group’s safe haven is smaller and less secure, and its ability to prepare and conduct terrorist operations has been degraded in important ways.” Days later, Brennan told a forum audience at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that AQAP “is now the most operationally active node of the al Qaeda network.”
AQAP’s activity has included its involvement in two recent terrorist plots aimed at America: the attempted Christmas Day bombing of a Northwest airliner in 2009, and the October 2010 discovery of explosive devices in two cargo planes en route to the United States.
While both incidents were AQAP failures, it still hasn’t deterred the group from continuing on with its terrorist mission. Quite the contrary, as Brennan noted, “The group’s leadership clearly seeks to apply lessons learned from past attacks, including those of other groups. And their definition of success – stoking fear, even if their attacks fail – portends more such attacks.”
As if to confirm its newly elevated status, reports circulated within days of Brennan’s speech at Carnegie that AQAP was planning to poison the US food supply by targeting hotels and restaurants. Specifically, AQAP’s plan was to introduce harmful agents, such as ricin and cyanide, into salad bars and buffets at these properties.
Administration officials were quick to point out that AQAP did not have the capability to carry out such a plan. In fact, the plan itself falls outside of AQAP’s recently adopted strategy to forgo large, complex terrorist attacks in favor of smaller assaults on lesser value targets.
That new terror tactic was announced by AQAP in the November 2010 issue of Inspire, the group’s English online newspaper, which stated: “To bring down the U.S., we do not need to strike big. It is more feasible to stage smaller attacks that involve less players and less time to launch.”
However, while AQAP’s terrorist plots may be growing smaller in scope, its efforts to grow from a regional terrorist group to a transnational outfit have exponentially increased. These efforts have included an intensive campaign to recruit American Muslims, methods which include the widespread use of internet videos, online magazines such as Inspire, and the sermons of its most notorious cleric and top leader, the American Anwar Al Awlaki.
Awlaki, who is now hiding out in Yemen, has been linked to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the accused Christmas Day bomber, as well as to Major Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter who killed 13 people in 2009.
Awlaki has also been credited as being an inspirational leader to would-be Times Square Bomber, Faisal Shahzad; and Abdulhakim Muhammad, arrested for shooting two army recruiters in Arkansas in November 2009, killing one soldier and wounding the other.
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