Pages: 1 2
“We encouraged him to hang firm and to count on our backing,” Carter confided to his diary regarding the Shah on November 2, 1978. But within two months, as he explained in his memoir Keeping Faith, that backing had backtracked: “The reports I was receiving from the CIA, the State Department, and from diplomats of other countries, led me also to feel the Shah would have to leave.” Worse than Carter’s vacillating, which took on comedic proportions during the on-again off-again invitation for asylum to the ailing Shah, was the administration’s forked-tongue policy. Whereas Carter publicly backed the Shah, U.S. Ambassador to Iran William Sullivan, and numerous figures within Carter’s State Department, undermined the Shah—and Carter’s stated policy. “Ambassador Sullivan,” Carter recalls in Keeping Faith, “was recommending that we oppose the plans of the Shah, insist on his immediate departure, and try to form some kind of friendship or alliance with Khomeini…. Sullivan thought we should not oppose Khomeini’s take-over because his rule would lead to democracy.”
Thirty-three years later, top Obama administration officials were similarly all over the board in their take on Mubarak’s continued rule. “I would not refer to him as a dictator,” Vice President Joe Biden said of Mubarak on PBS Newshour on January 27, and rejected the idea that the Egyptian leader should resign. Hillary Clinton similarly characterized Mubarak’s government as “stable.” Within days, the president called for an “orderly transition” in Egypt that “must be meaningful, it must be peaceful, and it must begin now.”
The world still deals with Carter’s Iranian missteps. Should the Muslim Brotherhood or worse fill the leadership void in Egypt, the world may be reeling from the fallout three decades from now. The downside of allowing human rights to guide foreign policy is that often human rights paradoxically suffer. Anyone watching that ’70s show could have avoided replaying those mistakes in this ’70s show.
Ironically, the president who Obama so resembles on Middle Eastern policy is not impressed with his efforts. “I don’t have any feeling of success for what President Obama had done in the Middle East,” remarked Jimmy Carter at the LBJ presidential library in February. Tellingly, Carter concedes that Obama had dealt with the Egyptian crisis “about the same way I’d have handled it if I’d been in office.”
The original ’70s show ended when a Democratic president lost his reelection bid and his successor more than halved top tax rates, backed the Fed in tightening money, lifted price controls on oil, and pursued America’s just interests abroad that ironically achieved his predecessor’s unrealized aim of furthering human rights. Next year, American viewers determine whether this low-rated ’70s repeat gets cancelled—or reruns in syndication for a four more years.
Daniel J. Flynn is the author of Why the Left Hates America, Intellectual Morons: How Ideology Makes Smart People Fall for Stupid Ideas, A Conservative History of the American Left, and the forthcoming Blue Collar Intellectuals. He writes a Monday column at www.humanevents.com and blogs at www.flynnfiles.com.
Pages: 1 2