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Reading from the same script, the president’s many friends in the media spent last week pounding Gov. Mitt Romney for daring to turn a U.S. foreign policy problem into a political issue. They called the GOP nominee “irresponsible” and “craven” and “disgraceful.” One media mouthpiece gasped that Romney had “launched a political attack even before acts of embassy violence were known.” For his part, President Barack Obama dismissed Romney for “shooting before aiming,” and then promptly declared that Egypt was neither an ally nor an enemy—something that came as news to the State Department and to Egypt. (Sadly but not surprisingly, this enormous diplomatic gaffe/blunder was not newsworthy to the president’s press.) Media mantras notwithstanding, not only was Romney right on the merits—America’s embassies should never apologize for America’s values—he did nothing outside the American political tradition when he criticized U.S. foreign policy during a political campaign. Foreign policy failures are fair game in presidential politics—and have been ever since America emerged as a global power.
Three months into the Great War—to that point, the most dire and dangerous foreign policy crisis in American history—TR lambasted Woodrow Wilson’s foreign policy. “The course of the present administration in foreign affairs,” he wrote in a scathing op-ed, “has combined officiously offensive action toward foreign powers with tame submission to wrongdoing by foreign powers.” The former president openly criticized Wilson for leaving America unprepared for war. “When, early in 1909, our battle fleet returned from its sixteen months’ voyage the world, there was no navy in the world which, size for size, ship for ship and squadron for squadron, stood at a higher pitch of efficiency. We blind ourselves to the truth if we believe that the same is true now…At present our navy is lamentably short in many different material directions. There is actually but one torpedo for each torpedo tube. It seems incredible that such can be the case; yet it is the case. We are many thousands of men short in our enlistments.”
In the autumn of 1952, Ike called Korea a “tragedy,” “the burial ground for 20,000 American dead,” and “a damning measure of the quality of leadership we have been given.” The general-turned-candidate blamed the outgoing Truman administration for a “record of failure.” Conveying the exasperation of an entire nation, he asked, “Is there an end?” And he warned that “neither glib promises nor glib excuses” would suffice in answering that question.
Running for president in 1960, JFK pointed to a supposed “missile gap” with the Soviet Union as evidence of America’s weakening defenses. “We are facing a gap on which we are gambling with our survival,” JFK warned. “This year’s defense budget is our last chance to do something about it,” he added for dramatic effect. But as historian Richard Reeves later wrote, “He was lying.” In truth, the only missile gap was the vast chasm between Moscow’s three—three—ICBMs and America’s atomic arsenal of Polaris-equipped submarines, 108 ICBMs and 600 nuclear bombers. CIA briefers even informed the Kennedy campaign of this, but the attacks continued. Reeves notes that the day before JFK’s inauguration, Ike made it clear to his young successor that the “missile gap” was myth—something the Kennedy administration admitted less than a month later.
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