That’s not just the literal meaning of the ruling which states that a Maine school forbidding a boy who claims that his gender identity is that of a girl from using the bathroom is discrimination, but also the practical effect of the ruling which uses discrimination law to argue that, effectively, gender segregated bathrooms are illegal.
The school directed Maines, the boy in question, to use the staff bathroom, after complaints by family members of students.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court on Thursday reversed a lower court’s decision that banned a transgender boy from using the girls’ bathroom in Orono schools.
In a 5-1 decision, the justices said that Superior Court Justice William Anderson erred when he ruled in favor of what is now Riverside RSU 26.
The Chief Justice dissented by pointing out the obvious implications of this ridiculous decision.
[T]he Court has concluded, as it must based on the statutes, that discrimination in the public accommodation of communal bathrooms is prohibited based on sexual orientation. The statute requiring that result also prohibits discrimination based simply on “sex.”
Thus, the next logical step given the Court’s inevitable interpretation of the existing statute is, as the dissent points out, the assertion that access to the public accommodation of designated communal bathrooms cannot be denied based on a person’s sex.
Put simply, it could now be argued that it would be illegal discrimination for a restaurant, for example, to prohibit a man from using the women’s communal bathroom, and vice versa.
That’s exactly the outcome. The idiotic logic of discrimination law has led us step by step to this point. If any form of separation is illegal, then so are gender segregated bathrooms.
We’ve gone from lunch counter equality to bathroom equality.
Justice Mead points out that,
The broad principle established by the Court’s interpretation of the MHRA is that access to multiple-user public bathrooms may not be denied based upon sexual orientation. That principle, by implication, applies equally to the other categories enumerated in the MHRA.
Specifically, it means that no person may be denied access to a public bathroom in a school or other place of public accommodation on the basis of their race, color, physical or mental disability, religion, ancestry, national origin, or sex. Thus, the MHRA, as construed by the Court today, prevents the denial of access to any public bathroom on the basis of a person’s sex.
Obviously this result is an extraordinary departure from the well-established custom that public bathrooms are typically segregated by sex.
Ah, but that custom is discriminatory. It also offends transgender men who hate being reminded that they aren’t really women.