At the time of Ambassador Stevens’ visit, February 17 militia members had stopped accompanying Special Mission vehicle movements in protest over salary and working hours. The Board’s inquiry found little evidence that the armed February 17 guards offered any meaningful defense of the SMC, or succeeded in summoning a February 17 militia presence to assist expeditiously.
The word "Muslim Brotherhood" isn't used, but that's who the militia members that Obama Inc. relied on to protect the Benghazi mission were affiliated with. Instead of keeping the Marines there, or any reasonable security force, a Muslim Brotherhood militias was tasked with protecting the mission, instead it likely played a role in setting up the attack with one of the dead Americans reporting that a guard had been taking pictures of the mission before the attack.
An independent review of the deadly attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi made public Tuesday night faults “systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels” of the State Department.
The report by the Accountability Review Board says the local mission's reliance on Libyan guards and militia members was “misplaced” and that the Libyan government's response was “profoundly lacking.” However it “did not find reasonable cause to determine that any individual U.S. government employee breached his or her duty.”
The report also confirms that there was no peaceful protest ahead of the attack that killed Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans, as the Obama administration initially said in the days after the attack.
“The Board concluded that there was no protest prior to the attacks, which were unanticipated in their scale and intensity,” the report says.
Some portions of the report are still classified and the independent review is not all that independent considering that Hillary Clinton selected four members of the review board, and the other was selected by DNI Clapper, who was the man who reportedly wrote Al Qaeda out of the CIA talking points.
So don't expect anything truly groundbreaking here. The report, irrationally, praises the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, while blaming austerity, even as the State Department was blowing millions on green energy and embassy art, not to mention mosque renovations, and instead urges Congress to give the State Department more money.
"Responsibility for the tragic loss of life, injuries, and damage to U.S. facilities and property rests solely and completely with the terrorists who perpetrated the attacks," the report begins, and then goes through a laundry list of who to blame.
Systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels within two bureaus of the State Department (the “Department”) resulted in a Special Mission security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi and grossly inadequate to deal with the attack that took place.
Embassy Tripoli (Stevens) did not demonstrate strong and sustained advocacy with Washington for increased security for Special Mission Benghazi.
Overall, the number of Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) security staff in Benghazi on the day of the attack and in the months and weeks leading up to it was inadequate, despite repeated requests from Special Mission Benghazi and Embassy Tripoli for additional staffing.
In just a few paragraphs, Stevens is blaming for not constantly requesting more personnel, in the next paragraph after that we are told he did repeatedly request more personnel. The report blames DC for not providing security, and then Stevens for not asking for security, and then DC for not providing the security that he asked for.
Meanwhile the Muslim Brotherhood was apparently going on strike
At the same time, the SMC’s dependence on the armed but poorly skilled Libyan February 17 Martyrs’ Brigade (February 17) militia members and unarmed, locally contracted Blue Mountain Libya (BML) guards for security support was misplaced.
Although the February 17 militia had proven effective in responding to improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on the Special Mission in April and June 2012, there were some troubling indicators of its reliability in the months and weeks preceding the September attacks. At the time of Ambassador Stevens’ visit, February 17 militia members had stopped accompanying Special Mission vehicle movements in protest over salary and working hours.
The Board’s inquiry found little evidence that the armed February 17 guards offered any meaningful defense of the SMC, or succeeded in summoning a February 17 militia presence to assist expeditiously.
Which is a fancy way of saying that the Muslim Brotherhood militia did nothing when the attack took place.