Israel 2012: Tactical Brilliance, Strategic Imbecility

Decades of suicidal concessions reveal a country ruled by madness.

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The ultimate test of this agreement will be a test of blood.... If it becomes clear that they [the Palestinians] cannot overcome terror, this will be a temporary accord and... we will have no choice but to abrogate it. And if there is no choice, the IDF will return to the places which it is about to leave in the upcoming months. – Yossi Beilin, on the Oslo Accords, Ma’ariv, November 26, 1993.

Is it just me or is there something dreadfully wrong – almost grotesquely absurd – with the government not only asking a member of the Muslim Brotherhood to broker a deal for it in a conflict with... the Muslim Brotherhood, but, incredibly, also to adjudicate in the case of alleged breaches?

Things can’t get any more topsy-turvy crazy than that, can they?

Mad Hatters and March Hares

The dementia that has seized the policy- making process in Israel, and the mindless prattle of the political pundits that accompanies it, has become so pervasive that it is increasingly difficult to grasp.

Indeed, were the characters from Lewis Caroll’s fantasy Wonderland to tumble down a rabbit hole into Israel, they would be likely to find the events here so nonsensical and far-fetched, that they would make the Mad Hatter’s head spin with bewilderment, and the eyes of the March Hare glaze over with disbelief.

True, Israel has made impressive – indeed in many respects, unprecedented – advances over the years. In many – probably most – areas it is on the cutting- edge of human endeavor. In terms of accomplishment in science and technology, in medicine and agriculture, IT and genetics its record of performance is virtually unsurpassed – especially if its minuscule size and short history are taken into account.

Yet this impressive accumulation of achievement has done little to secure Israel from existential threats to its political and physical survival.

For the past few decades – arguably from 1977, but inarguably from 1993 – successive governments have led the country into increasingly perilous predicaments, which are inexorably bringing its long-term durability into serious question.

For this, leaders have been showered with international acclaim, and some even with a Nobel Peace Prize.

There is good reason for the poor Hatter’s head to spin and the luckless Hare’s eyes to glaze.

Googling the right to exist

To get an indication of just how acceptable it has become to debate Israel’s very right to exist, try the following: Choose the name of any county, and run a Google search to determine how many sites on the Web refer to its “right to exist.” The results are stunning and revealing.

A search I conducted hours before submission of this column yielded the following results: Only one site deals with Somalia’s “right to exist,” while three deal with Mexico’s. A search for “Greece’s right to exist” produced 171 hits. “Sweden’s right to exists” came up with 183 hits, and Syria’s 1,700. Troubled Lebanon, torn by ethnic conflict and internecine violence, came up with 25,400 sites – which sounds rather a lot until you come to Israel.

For when the “right to exist” of the Jewish state is googled – the only genuinely democratic state in the region, the only state that practices religious tolerance and societal pluralism, the only state that eschews gender apartheid and gay persecution – a staggering 6,780,000 hits are obtained.

It is difficult to imagine any starker and more compelling evidence of just how legitimate it has become to discuss, and by implication, question, Israel’s legitimacy.

Concessions counterproductive This underscores not only how futile Israel’s policy of territorial concession and political appeasement has been, but also how counterproductive it has proved.

Time and time again, it has been irrefutably shown that that no matter what Israel does – or refrains from doing – harsh international condemnation persists unabated.

To no avail, Israel has:
• evacuated the Sinai peninsula;
• relinquished its oil resources and forgone its strategic depth:
• allowed armed militias to deploy adjacent to its capital and within mortar range of its parliament;
• razed Jewish towns and villages in Gaza;
• uprooted Jewish graveyards; and
• laid waste settlements in northern Samaria.

However, rather than elicit any gesture of goodwill or reciprocity, each concession has merely caused the other side to ratchet up its demands. Every concession made merely created the expectation of yet another one; every withdrawal, the clamor for further retreat.

Yet despite the accumulated weight of indisputable evidence, no elected leader has shown real awareness of the need, much less the will, to terminate this self-defeating – and self-destructive – downward spiral.

Strategic deterioration

Despite dramatic techno-tactical advances, ever since Menachem Begin frittered away the strategic advantages and economic potential of Sinai in exchange for a few decades of uneasy and prickly non-belligerency with Egypt, Israel has been in strategic retreat.

For whatever the reasons, it has declined from being a nation that within six days could rout three regular Arab armies (plus reinforcements from numerous other countries), obliterate the enemy air power and armor, and seize vast tracts of lands, to one that fails – repeatedly – to silence bombardment of its civilian population by small, lightly armed irregular militias, which have no air support (or even air-defense systems), armor or navy.

In many ways, the emerging situation facing Israel today would have been inconceivable at the times when the decisions that that precipitated it were taken.

Thus it is inconceivable that Menachem Begin would have agreed to evacuate Sinai if he had envisaged that it would degenerate into a lawless noman’s land, in the grip of Islamist warlords and ruthless criminal gangs pressing up against Israel’s long southern border while an Islamist regime was ensconced in Cairo. It is inconceivable that Yitzhak Rabin would have agreed to the far-reaching concessions made in the Oslo process, had he foreseen the kind of realities they would bring about.

His final address to the Knesset, in which he conveyed his vision of the permanent solution with the Palestinians, would be dismissed as unrealistic extremism, were it adopted today by any incumbent politician.

But as the status quo deteriorated, Israel’s leaders resigned themselves to the new circumstances, and merely braced for the next deterioration – until it has become almost impossible to imagine different realities or even different trends in realities, certainly none reminiscent of pre-Oslo or pre-Camp David conditions.

After all, for most Israelis, these former realities are not even a distant memory.

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