In a bold stroke of diplomacy, President Trump sent CIA Director and Secretary of State-designate Mike Pompeo to North Korea to meet with its dictator Kim Jong-un during the Easter weekend. On Wednesday President Trump confirmed the meeting in a tweet, in which he said that the meeting “went very smoothly and a good relationship was formed.” The president added that details were being worked out for the summit meeting he hopes to have with Kim Jong-un in May or early June. Five locations are being considered for the summit. “Denuclearization will be a great thing for World, but also for North Korea!” President Trump tweeted.

Kim Jong-un is reportedly planning to formally announce that he is willing to denuclearize North Korea when he meets with South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in later this month. In addition, according to an April 18th report in the New York Times, South Korea confirmed that “it had been in talks with American and North Korean officials about negotiating a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War after more than 60 years, as the United States and its ally try to establish a basis for persuading the North to give up its nuclear weapons.” President Trump indicated that he had given his “blessing” to North and South Korea for their talks aimed at negotiating a peace treaty to replace the 1953 armistice, which would formally put an end to the technical state of war between the two Koreas.

While such developments leading to the increased possibility of a diplomatic solution to the Korean Peninsula crisis have created hope in some quarters, caution is in order. North Korea’s past record of broken promises speaks for itself. Time after time, its leaders have gamed agreements to pocket concessions made by the United States and its allies while continuing to advance North Korea’s nuclear arms and ballistic missile programs. President Trump’s policy of exerting maximum economic pressure on North Korea, including by bringing China on board at least in part, has no doubt played a major role in moving North Korea towards consideration of denuclearization in the first place. Letting up on the economic pressure campaign too early will give North Korea invaluable breathing room to continue parts of its programs in secret. It will be very difficult, if not impossible, to put all the stringent multilateral sanctions back into place with broad international consensus so long as North Korea acts like it is interested in peace.

The threshold question is how North Korea defines “denuclearization.” It seems inconceivable that Kim Jong-un would agree to disarm all of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, remove from his country all bomb-grade nuclear fuel, and seal or dismantle all its nuclear research, development and production facilities. Kim Jong-un would also resist destroying North Korea’s complete stock of ballistic missiles designed to have the capability of delivering nuclear weapons and dismantling its related research, development and production facilities.

The most one can anticipate from Kim Jong-un, who has made a credible nuclear deterrent the central feature of his foreign policy, is something along the lines of a freeze as proposed previously by China and Russia, to be followed by phased scale downs of the nuclear arms and intercontinental missile programs over an extended period. Each scale down phase would be tied to significant concessions from the United States and its allies. When Kim Jong-un met with President Xi Jinping of China last month, he called for just such a “phased” and “synchronized” approach to any deal involving his agreement to denuclearization, which could be stretched out for years. Moreover, Kim Jong-un will almost certainly insist on keeping a reserve of residual nuclear weapons, bomb grade nuclear fuel and ballistic missiles for “insurance” purposes. As for verification of North Korea’s compliance with whatever commitments it decides to make, it is unlikely that the hermit kingdom of North Korea would ever agree to unfettered inspections anywhere and at any time by international inspectors. We know that in the past the North Korean government broke United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) seals and destroyed surveillance equipment.

Assuming we get past the threshold question of whether there can be a meeting of the minds on the meaning of “denuclearization” and its timetable, the second question is what concessions Kim Jong-un is likely to demand in exchange for moving in some meaningful way along the path of verifiable denuclearization. In the past, North Korea has demanded the withdrawal of American troops stationed in South Korea. This time around Kim might accept a major reduction in U.S. troops, allowing a token force to remain, which will still amount to a withdrawal in all but the terminology used to describe it. North Korea will also likely demand an end to significant joint military exercises involving South Korea and the United States near its coastline. President Trump may be willing to entertain such a proposal, at least in part, to help meet his goal of reducing U.S. expenditures incurred in maintaining military footprints overseas except where necessary to protect vital U.S. national security interests.

Hugh White, a senior military strategist who worked at the Australian Department of Defense and is now a professor at Australian National University, was quoted by the _New York Times’ _April 18th report as theorizing that, to President Trump, “it could make sense to withdraw from Korea if in return Kim Jong-un scrapped the ICBM program and thus ceased to threaten the continental United States.” Japan is likely to have real concerns about such an American pullback, however. South Korea, despite its zeal for normalization of relations with North Korea, may have the jitters as well. Moreover, as Mr. White noted, “It would be a big win for China.”

Aside from demanding a sharp reduction in the U.S.’s military presence in the region, Kim Jong-un can be expected to demand the early lifting of economic sanctions and an influx of economic assistance. During Kim’s visit to China, he may have received assurances from China’s leadership that North Korea’s biggest trading partner would have his back in such negotiations. Kim may be planning to visit Russia soon to seek its support as well.

Front-loading sanctions relief or significant economic assistance for North Korea will lead to the same trap former President Barack Obama created in his disastrous nuclear deal with Iran. We lost the main leverage we had over Iran, short of military action. Like Iran, North Korea will be able to enjoy many of the economic benefits early on, stripping the United States and its allies of the upper hand to pressure North Korea into fulfilling all its commitments. History will repeat itself.

None of this is to say that the diplomatic route is not worth trying. War should remain the last resort. However, President Trump must not be lulled into a false sense of security from agreements on paper, even if North Korea’s commitments are supposedly “guaranteed” by China. The president must keep his promise not to let up on exerting maximum economic pressure until we are satisfied ourselves that North Korea is well down the road of complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization.