In The Truth About Biden’s Fake War With Russia, I already made the case why any claim that we’re going to be involved in a war with Russia anytime soon is nonsense.
NATO is largely a fiction. The idea that America and Europe would go to war with Russia over an invasion of a NATO nation (let alone a non-NATO one like Ukraine) is another myth.
When Russian planes invaded Turkish airspace leading to the first casualties and exchange of fire between a NATO member and Russia since the end of the Cold War, nothing happened except anxious meetings in which NATO members made it clear that they didn’t want to be involved. Message received. Turkey befriended Russia and made it its new arms dealer.
The United States is not going to war with Russia, and Russia is not going to war with us.
Neither Biden nor Putin want to fight a world war. And if there were any chance of one happening, the troops would be going home right now. But both profit from the illusion of war.
Biden wants to pretend that he stopped a war and Putin wants to prove that America is weak.
At the Center for Security Policy, there’s a set of logical arguments for why there won’t even be any meaningful invasion of the Ukraine.
While provocations on the Russian-Ukrainian border and local hostilities are possible, there will be no large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine and big war in Europe in the near future.
Instead, this has been a psychological operation designed to intimidate Ukrainian leadership to surrender to Putin by agreeing to the execution of the Minsk agreements. The objective is to make Ukrainians – both authorities and citizens – believe in the real prospect of a full-scale war, and under its threat, agree to Minsk – which will seem like a small loss when compared to losses incurred in a full-scale war…
Second, Russian troops’ recent movements have been done openly. When Putin attacked Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014-15, he prepared secretly. When Putin acts openly, as he is now, it is not preparation of a real attack, but the conduct of operations of a different nature – bluff, blackmail, and intimidation.
Third, the actual location of the Russian troops does not confirm their readiness for an offensive. Most sources refer to the deployment of troops in a strip along the Russian-Ukrainian border, but at a distance of 250-260 km. Troops preparing for an immediate offensive would not deployed that far away.
If visible indicators mean what they seem to – if Putin isn’t engaging in “mere” brinkmanship – the indicators are there. The massing of a shipborne landing force in the Black Sea is obviously a big one.
Much of the ground force weaponry for a major action was assembled in western Russia and Belarus 2-3 weeks ago, but in recent days some key additions have been the apparent arrival of a field hospital, and Russian military special forces (SSO) support vehicles seen on the move in Smolensk, a couple dozen miles from Belarus.
The announced major exercise in western Russia, which includes allied operations with Belarus, is getting underway. However, a full-scale deployment of SSO, in particular, is unusual for such exercises (even big ones). Deploying SSO into Belarus, especially by road with support vehicles, looks like an arrangement with a longer-term objective in view.
Whether or there is large-scale fighting in the Ukraine, the key thing is that it won’t involve us.